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Nietzsche And The Religion Of The Future

Steven Michels
Sacred Heart University
michelsS@sacredheart.edu

The waters of religion are ebbing away and
leaving behind swamps or stagnant pools.1
This article examines the place of religion in Nietzsche’s writings and how it fits
with the task of a “new philosopher.” Although Nietzsche opposes all otherworldly,
monotheistic religions, it is incorrect to say that Nietzsche proposes atheism as a solution.
Religion, he contends, is an essential part of any healthy culture. Nietzsche’s new
philosophy would fashion gods consistent with the natural order of rank and the highest
aims of man.
Nietzsche conceives of modernity not as progress but an unhealthy and dangerous
break with tradition that he seeks to set right. Consequently, he turns to the greatness of
antiquity. Nietzsche, for example, follows the ancients in affirming the superiority of
philosophy to politics. Nietzsche’s new philosophy is characterized by its ability to
use—and indeed govern—religion, science, and politics for the sake of high culture. The
death of god is a terrible event, but it makes possible the discovery of the will as a fact of
nature and the creation of new gods. Rather than merely opposing modernity or
appealing to antiquity, Nietzsche looks past modernity to create something new and
greater.
I. Religion And Culture
Seeing Nietzsche as anything other than anti-religious is quite a feat. Statements
in favor of religion are usually overshadowed by statements to the contrary, so it is all too
easy to emphasize his anti-religious bent. His claim that “there are no moral phenomena

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Untimely Meditations, R. J. Hollingdale
trans. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), §4.
1
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at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena” implies an absolute freedom for
moral interpretation.2 And earlier in that work, Nietzsche refutes both god and the devil.3
Although he is regarded as an atheist who revels in the death of god, nowhere
does Nietzsche advocate an exclusively atheist agenda. For instance, he does not herald
atheism as the antidote for the ascetic. As John Andrew Bernstein contends, “Nietzsche
never attempted a logical refutation of the possibility of God’s existence.”4 Furthermore,
Nietzsche is only reluctantly celebratory in proclaiming the death of god: he calls it “the
great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe—the most
terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles.”5 His
Zarathustra, we should recall, was so bothered by the death of god that he retreated to the
mountaintop where he remained in solitude for ten years.6 For all of his disdain for
Christianity, the opposite is true of his stance on religion: Nietzsche wants a new faith as
much as he wants a new philosophy, a view that is only now being taken seriously.7
These two views of Nietzsche are reconciled by examining, for lack of a better
term, level of analysis. Nietzsche applies the doctrine of the will to power to individuals;
a people, however, needs a faith. “A people that still believes in itself retains its own
god,” he writes. “In him it reveres the conditions which let it prevail, its virtues: it
projects its pleasure in itself, its feeling of power, into a being to whom one may offer
thanks….Under such conditions, religion is a form of thankfulness.”8 The health and
growth of a people is tied to its beliefs: the strong have faith; the weak have nothing.
Of course Nietzsche is not an advocate for all religions. Certain ones, Christianity
for example, remain undesirable. “Formerly [god] represented a people, the strength of a
people, everything aggressive and power-thirsty in the soul of a people,” he writes.
“Now he is merely the good god.”9 In a sense, Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity is made
in the name of god and religion. Christianity is not only at odds with nature, but also
with the very concept of what a religion should be. Good religions and just gods are

2

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1966),
§108.
3
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §37.
4
Bernstein continues: “Nietzsche never attempted a logical refutation of the possibility of God’s existence. He
does not appear to have thought it attainable. What he substituted was a genetic reduction of faith, which was
clearly intended to have the effect of a refutation by suspicion….Nietzsche’s implication is that the belief in
God is traceable to human needs.” John Andrew Bernstein, Nietzsche’s Moral Philosophy (Cranbury, NJ:
Associated University Presses, 1987), 165-66.
5
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY:
Vintage, 1989), §3.27.
6
Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York,
NY: Penguin Books, 1982), Afterworldly.
7
See Tyler T. Roberts, Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1998); and Weaver Santaniello, Nietzsche and the Gods (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).
8
Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Antichrist,” Portable Nietzsche, §16.
9
Nietzsche, “The Antichrist,” §16.
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those that reflect the needs of a people. Nietzsche refers to a desirable ruler-type as a
“Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul.”10
The problems with Christianity become more evident when it is compared to
Islam. “Islam is a thousand times right in despising Christianity,” Nietzsche claims.
“Islam presupposes men.”11 Christianity, by contrast:
has cheated us out of the harvest of ancient culture; later it cheated us
again, out of the harvest of the culture of Islam. The wonderful world of
the Moorish culture of Spain, really more closely related to us, more
congenial to our senses and tastes than Rome and Greece, was trampled
down….Because it owed its origin to noble, to male instincts, because it
said Yes to life even with rare and refined luxuries of Moorish life.12
Nietzsche blames Christianity for the inability of Islam to find a wider audience.
Nevertheless, Islam, like Christianity, is an otherworldly-monotheism, the very sort of
religion that his new religion points away from.
It is through Nietzsche’s examination of religion that he is able to assess the
vitality of a people. “The difference among men becomes manifest not only in the
difference between their tablets of goods,” he writes. “It becomes manifest even more in
what they take for really having and possessing something good.”13 His estimation of a
people is connected directly to its estimation of itself. Strong cultures relish their
strengths, while weak cultures ignore even their most debilitating weaknesses, to the
point of pitying criminals14 and using the sick as doctors.15 Nietzsche understands the
importance of religion enough to judge among them.
Nietzsche’s view of religion is very much tied to an emphasis on tradition as the
basis for culture. It is worth quoting at length.
Morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs,
of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way
of behaving and evaluating. In things in which no tradition commands
there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the
smaller the circle of morality. The free human being is immoral because
in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon a
tradition….What is tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not
10

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967), §983.
For Walter Kaufmann, this phrase is “the very heart of Nietzsche’s vision of the overman. Being capable of
both sympathy and hardness, of loving and ruling, not using claws though having them.” From Shakespeare to
Existentialism (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), 300.
11
Nietzsche, “The Antichrist,” §A 59.
12
Nietzsche, “The Antichrist,” §60.
13
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §194.
14
Nietzsche, Genealogy, §2.10.
15
Nietzsche, Genealogy, §3.15.
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because it commands what is useful to us, but because it
commands…Originally all education and care of health, marriage, cure of
sickness, agriculture, war, speech and silence, traffic with one another and
with the gods belonged within the domain of morality: they demanded one
observe prescriptions without thinking of oneself as an individual.
Originally, therefore, everything was custom, and whoever wanted to
elevate himself above it had to become lawgiver and medicine man and a
kind of demi-god: that is to say, he had to make customs—a dreadful,
mortally dangerous thing! Who is the most moral man? First, he who
obeys the law most frequently….Then, he who obeys it even in the most
difficult cases. The most moral man is he who sacrifices the most to
custom…the individual is to sacrifice himself—that is the commandment
of morality of custom.16
Nietzsche sees the needs of culture to be served by tradition and custom: this is
the role for morality. Modern man seeks other justification for his morality. Nietzsche
writes:
Those moralists, on the other hand, who, following in the footsteps of
Socrates, offer the individual a morality of self-control and temperance as
a means to his own advantage, as his personal key to happiness, are the
exceptions—and if it seems otherwise to us that is because we have been
brought up in their after-effect: they all take a new path under the highest
disapprobation of all advocates of morality of custom—they cut
themselves off from the community, as immoral men, and are in the
profoundest sense evil.17
From Socrates onward, morality becomes a means to self-control and personal
fulfillment. Modern morality serves only the individual—and not very well.
Contrary to what most interpreters would have us believe, Nietzsche does not
open up the moral world to any and all interpretations; Nietzsche even warns us against
doing so. What he wishes to stress is the role of philosophy in interpreting morality.
Philosophers do not have the right to interpret morality as a personal preference; rather,
they are bound to do so within the confines of nature and the health of a people. Hence
Nietzsche calls for a radical reevaluation of the nature and purpose of morality. “High
spirituality itself exists only as the ultimate product of moral qualities,” he posits. “It is a
synthesis of all those states which are attributed to ‘merely moral’ men, after they have
been acquired singly through long discipline and exercise, perhaps through whole chains
of generations…high spirituality is the spiritualization of justice and of that gracious
severity which knows that it is its mission to maintain the order of rank in the world,
among things themselves—and not only among men.”18 The order of rank informs
16

Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
§9.
17
Nietzsche, Daybreak, §9.
18
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §219.

55

STEVEN MICHELS: NIETZSCHE AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE
religion, just as it informs the will. Nietzsche’s morality is a sort of “high spirituality”
accessible only to those capable of knowing the standard for equality and justice as it is
found “not only among men,” but primarily as it exists in nature.
Nietzsche questions all morality in light of this consideration: “Moralities must be
forced to bow first of all before the order of rank; their presumption must be brought
home to their conscience—until they finally reach agreement it is immoral to say: ‘what
is right for one is fair for the other.’”19 Later he notes, “there is an order of rank between
man and man, hence also between morality and morality.”20 Although Nietzsche depicts
the victory of “good and evil” over “good and bad,” the battle has not everywhere been
decided: “One might even say that it has risen ever higher and thus become more and
more profound and spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a
‘higher nature,’ a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a
genuine battleground of these opposed values.”21
Previous moral philosophers, however, have done nothing to prevent freedom for
moral interpretation. “That philosophers’ invention…the invention of ‘free will,’ of the
absolute spontaneity of man in good and in evil, was devised above all to furnish a right
to the idea that the interest of the gods in man, in human virtue, could never be
exhausted.”22 Morality has been interpreted to advance what is low (and formerly bad) in
man as good, possible, and, worst of all, necessary.
Nietzsche’s protests of other “interpretations” of morality now become clearer.
He equates the Romans with strength and nobility and the Jews with its opposite,
“ressentiment par excellence.”23 Nietzsche holds a high, or perhaps even higher, regard
for the morality of the Greeks and the “abundance of gratitude that it exudes.”24
Continuing, he notes: “it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in this
way. Later, when the rabble gained the upper hand in Greece, fear became rampant in
religion, too—and the ground was prepared for Christianity.”25 Morality, Nietzsche
contends, should be gauged according to how it affects the strength of a people.26 He
seeks to construct or recognize a religion consistent with nature and the needs of a great
people. Christian morality will be replaced by a life-affirming morality of rank, far
superior with regard to nature and its service to culture.
The difference is illustrated in Nietzsche’s comparison of the New Testament
with the Old. While he goes to great lengths to oppose Christianity, Nietzsche speaks
with reverence regarding the Old Testament:
19

Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §221.
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §228.
21
Nietzsche, Genealogy, §1.16.
22
Nietzsche, Genealogy, §2.7.
23
Nietzsche, Genealogy, §1.16.
24
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §49.
25
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §49.
26
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §188; Will to Power, §151.
20
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In the Jewish ‘Old Testament,’ the book of divine justice, there are human
beings, things, and speeches in so grand a style that Greek and Indian
literature have nothing to compare with it. With terror and reverence one
stands before these tremendous remnants of what man once
was…whoever is himself merely a meager, tame domestic animal and
knows only the needs of domestic animals…has not cause for amazement
or sorrow among these ruins—the taste for the Old Testament is a
touchstone for ‘great’ and ‘small’….To have glued this New
Testament…to the Old Testament to make one book, as the ‘Bible,’ as ‘the
book par excellence’—that is perhaps the greatest audacity and ‘sin
against the spirit’ that literary Europe has on its conscience.27
The difference between the two, Nietzsche argues, is that in the Old Testament he
finds “great human beings, a heroic landscape, and something of the very rarest quality in
the world, the incomparable naïveté of the strong heart; what is more, I find a people.”28
The New Testament did a great disservice to the great tradition of religion and faith that
preceded it.
Some religions can also be used for educative purposes, including preparation for
leadership. It is possible, Nietzsche notes, for some, “those ascending classes,” to “walk
the paths to higher spirituality.”29 Here asceticism and Puritanism are useful. Asceticism
is useful for philosophers but not for philosophizing. When applied to some, and not all,
their existence becomes, not only tolerable, but “indispensable” to the advance of a
people. For those incapable of rule—that is the “vast majority” of “ordinary human
beings”—
religion gives an inestimable contentment with their situation and type,
manifold peace of the heart, an ennobling of obedience, one further
happiness and sorrow with their peers and something transfiguring and
beautifying, something of a justification for the whole everyday character,
the whole lowliness, the whole half-brutish poverty of their souls…it is
refreshing, refining, makes, as it were, the most of suffering, and in the
end even sanctifies and justifies.30
Nietzsche replaces the tyranny of modern morality with a three-fold typology.
Religion can be: an instrument of rule, a means of instructing the “ascending classes” for
future rule, or a means of distracting or placating those who are stationary and unfit for
rule. This last quality is perhaps the only benefit of either Christianity or Buddhism, the

27

Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §52.
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §3.23.
29
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §61.
30
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §61.
28
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latter of which excels at it. As he contends: “Philosophy is not suited for the masses.
What they need is holiness.”31
This is the reason Nietzsche does not wish completely to rid philosophy of the
soul. It is not necessary, he claims, “to renounce one of the most ancient and venerable
hypotheses….But the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soulhypothesis; and such conceptions as ‘moral soul,’ and ‘soul as subjective multiplicity,’
and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and affects,’ want henceforth to have citizens’
rights in science.”32 It is modern philosophy and science that is truly anti-Christian and
anti-soul.33 Nietzsche wishes not to abjure the concept of the soul, but to challenge it
with other claims, or to amend it with a concern for the will to power and the order of
rank. It is not possible for a rigid concept of the soul to serve knowledge. Instead,
Nietzsche opens up the way for a series of alternative and competing views of the soul,
each radically different from the Christian vision of it.
By interpreting morality in light of nature and the strength of a people,
philosophers become legislators, or creators of value. “The philosopher as we understand
him, we free spirits—as the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the
conscience for the over-all development of man—this philosopher will make use of
religions for his project of cultivation and education, just as he will make use of whatever
political and economic states are at hand.”34 Religion, Nietzsche notes, is an
indispensable tool for “the art of governance,” whether this means direct rule and
obedience or the use of surrogates, as in the case of the Brahmins.35 In the latter instance,
the philosophers then left themselves leisure for study and contemplation, free of the
demands of the political sphere. Hence the new philosophers can be philosophers and
kings. This view of morality and the gods means that, while god is dead, other gods are
very much waiting in the wings. “And how many new gods are still possible!” Nietzsche
exclaims. “As for myself, in whom the religious, that is to say god-forming, instinct
occasionally becomes active at impossible times—how differently, how variously the
divine has revealed itself to me each time!”36
Nietzsche believes that perspectivism will renew our sense of the divine. “At
times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them
henceforth their ‘convictions,’” he writes. “Later—we see them only as steps to selfknowledge, sign-posts to the problem we are—rather, to the great stupidity we are, to our
spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very deep down.”37 Human nature too easily
views success as a result of the will. The misunderstanding of the will to power too often
31

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Random House, 1967),
§3; Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), §115.
32
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §12.
33
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §54.
34
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §61.
35
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §61.
36
Nietzsche, Will to Power, §1038; Cf. §1039.
37
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §231.
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becomes spiritual in nature—an arbitrary morality. If morality is an error, the only
remedy is a philosophy open to other perspectives, including the creation of new gods.
Nietzsche warns, however, that the “other side” of religion is its “uncanny
dangerousness.” Philosophers must be wary “when religions do not want to be a means
of education and cultivation in the philosopher’s hand but insist on having their own
sovereign way, when they themselves want to be ultimate ends and not means among
other means.”38 Christianity and Buddhism fail in this regard as they “seek to preserve,”
and in the process they have become “religions for sufferers.”39 It is for this reason that
Nietzsche places religion—and with it politics—so delicately in the hands of his new
philosophers.
Religion, it seems, is necessary for any healthy and thriving political community.
Nietzsche is adamant, however, that religion be of a particular sort and, most importantly,
that it be placed under the control of those most capable of understanding its proper
usage.
II. The Greek Genius
Just as Nietzsche sought to rewrite, or at least to amend, the story of modernity,
he also wished to revisit antiquity to assess the reality, and the totality, of Greek culture.
For Nietzsche, Socrates and Plato were neither the whole nor the best of what the Greeks
have to offer about life and philosophy. “I recognized Socrates and Plato to be symptoms
of degeneration,” Nietzsche writes, “tools of the Greek dissolution, pseudo-Greek, antiGreek.”40 More specifically, Nietzsche argues against the “Socratic equation of reason,
virtue, and happiness: that most bizarre of all equations, which, moreover, is opposed to
all the instincts of the earlier Greeks.”41 In other words, Socrates and Plato were hardly
representative of the true Hellenic genius.
Socrates’ break with the Greeks is most evident in his preferred method. “With
Socrates,” Nietzsche writes, “Greek taste changes in favor of dialectics….Above all, a
noble taste is thus vanquished; with dialectics the plebs come to the top. Before Socrates
dialectic manners were repudiated in good society.”42 For Nietzsche, dialectics is a
barren form of No-saying.43 “One chooses dialectics only when one has no other means,”
he writes. “It can only be self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons.”44
38

Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §62.
Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §62.
40
Friedrich Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” Portable Nietzsche, Socrates §2.
41
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Socrates §4.
42
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Socrates §5.
43
Nietzsche’s repeated arguments against dialectics have not stopped some from including him among its
practitioners. “We take the position that his [Nietzsche’s] method is, in fact, very close to that of
Marx…Nietzsche employs the technique of dialectical critiques of values and institutions and, by retracing out
their history through genealogy, shows the original purpose and function for which these values were
established and how, over time, they are decomposed, destroyed and fragmented.” Georg Stauth and Bryan S.
39
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Nietzsche is not hostile to all the ancients, however; he is an admirer of
Thucydides, among others.45 Thucydides, Nietzsche writes:
takes the most comprehensive and impartial delight in all that is typical in
men and events and believes that to each type there pertains a quantum of
good sense: this he seeks to discover. He displays greater practical justice
than Plato; he does not revile or belittle those he does not like or who have
harmed him in life….Thus in him, the portrayer of man, that culture of the
most impartial knowledge of the world finds its last glorious flower.46
Thucydides presents his history of man for the sake of man. In Thucydides, the natural
beauty of man is a gift to posterity.
Nietzsche places other Greeks alongside Thucydides. Greece “had in Sophocles
its poet, in Pericles its statesman, in Hippocrates its physician, in Democritus its natural
philosopher,” he notes.47 Not surprisingly, Nietzsche sides with the Sophists against
Socrates and Plato. “The Sophists are no more than realists,” he contends. “They
formulate the values and practices common to everyone on the level of values—they
possess the courage of all strong spirits to know their own immorality.”48 The Sophists
were the real Greeks, and the real Greek teachers; it was Socrates and Plato that broke
with the tradition of their people.49
Nietzsche separates Thucydides and the other Greeks from Socrates and Plato
based on their choice of life over wisdom. This is not to say that the Greeks did not value
knowledge, however, for “the Greeks themselves, [were] possessed of an inherently
insatiable thirst for knowledge”; but they “controlled it by their ideal need for and
Turner, Nietzsche’s Dance: Resentment, Reciprocity and Resistance in Social Life, New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
22.
44
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Socrates §6; Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Marianne
Cowan, trans. (Washington, D.C.: Regenery Publishing, Inc., 1998), §3.
45
Robert Eden traces Nietzsche’s teaching on justice (and the eternal return) to Thucydides’ Melian dialogue.
Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida Press,
1983), 126.
46
Nietzsche, Daybreak, §168; Cf. “Twilight,” Ancients §2.
47
Nietzsche, Daybreak, §168.
48
Nietzsche, Will to Power, §429.
49
In one of his earliest works, Nietzsche includes Socrates among the “Greek masters”: “All other cultures are
put to shame by the marvelously idealized philosophical company represented by the ancient Greek masters
Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates. These men
are monolithic. Their thinking and their character stand in a relationship characterized by strictest necessity.
They are devoid of conventionality, for in their day there was not philosophic or academic professionalism. All
of them, in magnificent solitude, were the only ones in their time whose lives were devoted to insight alone.
They all possessed that virtuous energy of the ancients, herein excelling all men since, which led them to find
their own individual form and to develop it through all its metamorphoses to its subtlest and greatest
possibilities. For there was no convention to meet them half-way. Thus all of them together form what
Schopenhauer in contrast to the republic of scholars has called the republic of creative minds: each giant calling
to his brother through the desolate intervals of time. And undisturbed by the wanton noises of the dwarfs that
creep past beneath them, their high spirit-converse continues.” Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, §1.
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consideration of all the values of life. Whatever they learned, they wanted to live
through, immediately.”50 The Greeks, before Socrates at least, valued knowledge insofar
as it served life. For the Greeks, life was an open question: it was not possible, they
thought, to know for certain the value of life. Conversely, Socrates sought to answer
once and for all that very question. As Nietzsche explains it: “judgments, judgments of
value, concerning life, for it or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value
only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are stupidities…the value of life cannot
be estimated….For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life is thus an objection
to him, a question mark concerning his wisdom, an un-wisdom.”51 The question of life is
to remain unanswered; any solution may provide some guidance, but it may come at the
expense of other, potentially superior, perspectives.
There are countless other admirable qualities in the Greeks. The Greeks were, for
example, non-egalitarian in nature. “Other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages,”
Nietzsche writes.52 The Greeks knew how to honor great men, and especially great
thinkers: “It has been rightly said that a people is characterized not as much by its great
men as by the way in which it recognizes and honors its great men. In other times and
places, the philosopher is a chance wanderer, lonely in a totally hostile environment
which he either creeps past or attacks with clenched fist. Among the Greeks alone, he is
not an accident.”53 Nietzsche’s fear is not that men like Pericles will not be honored;
Nietzsche fears that they will no longer exist. For Nietzsche, Pericles was “the mightiest
and worthiest man on earth….[He] represented the visible human realization of the
constructive, moving, distinguishing, ordering, reviewing, planning, artistically creative,
self-determining power of the spirit.”54 The Greeks had a strong culture because they had
strong and worthy individuals carrying it on their shoulders.
The Greeks also had a different view of man and his relationship with nature. In
an unpublished aphorism, Nietzsche writes:
When one speaks of humanity, the idea is fundamental that this is
something which separates and distinguishes man from nature. In reality,
however, there is no such separation: ‘natural’ qualities and those called
truly ‘human’ are inseparably grown together. Man, in his highest and
noblest capacities, is wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual
character. Those of his abilities which are terrifying and considered

50

Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, §1.
Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes, “The idyllic shepherd of modern man is merely a counterfeit of the sum of
cultural illusions that are allegedly nature; the Dionysian Greek wants truth and nature in their most forceful
form—and sees himself changed, as by magic, into a satyr.” The Birth of Tragedy, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New
York, NY: Random House, 1967), §8.
51
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Socrates §2.
52
Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, §1.
53
Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, §1.
54
Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, §19.
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inhuman may even be the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can
grow in impulse, deed, and work.55
Nietzsche goes on to mention how the Greeks represented this view.56 For him,
the Greek view of nature is the standard by which modern culture ought to be judged.
Nor did the Greeks despise the body in the manner of modern morality. “The
Greeks remain the first cultural event in history,” Nietzsche writes. “They knew, they
did, what was needed; and Christianity, which despised the body, has been the greatest
misfortune of humanity so far.”57 Far from despising the body, the Greeks pronounced
even the most painful and routine elements of the body as holy, and revered it as such.
The body was the source of creation; and through it “there may be the eternal joy of
creating, that the will to life may eternally affirm itself.”58 The Greeks saw beauty in the
thing most hated by Christianity: human nature. In the Greek, the body takes its rightful
place among the things most revered.
III. Gods Who Philosophize
The Greeks also had a different view of the role of religion. “The Greeks,”
Nietzsche argues, “did not see the Homeric gods as set above them as masters, or
themselves set beneath the gods as servants, as the Jews did. They saw as it were only
the reflection of the most successful exemplars of their own caste, that is to say an ideal,
not an antithesis of their own nature.”59
Nietzsche also finds elements of his positive teaching in the Greeks, including the
will to power: “For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the
Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds its expression—its ‘will
to life.’”60 The will to power has its origin in Greek culture, where he claims they too
valued life over truth.

55

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” Portable Nietzsche, 32-39. Cf. The Gay
Science, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974), §155.
56
“In earlier times…the conviction that mankind was the goal of nature was so strong that it was assumed
without question that nothing could be disclosed by knowledge that was not salutary and useful to man, indeed
that things other than this could not, ought not to exist.—Perhaps all this leads to the proposition that truth, as a
whole and interconnectedly, exists only for souls which are at once powerful and harmless, and full of joyfulness
and peace (as was the soul of Aristotle), just as it will no doubt be only such souls as these that will be capable
of seeking it: for, no matter how proud they may be of their intellect and its freedom, the others are seeking cures
for themselves—they are not seeking truth. This is why these others take so little real pleasure in science, and
make of the coldness, dryness and inhumanity of science a reproach to it: it is the sick passing judgment on the
games of the healthy.—The Greek gods, too, were unable to offer consolation; when Greek mankind at last
one and all grew sick, this was a reason for the abolition of such gods.” Nietzsche, Daybreak, §424.
57
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Skirmishes §48.
58
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Ancients §4.
59
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, §114.
60
Nietzsche, “Twilight,” Ancients §4.

62

STEVEN MICHELS: NIETZSCHE AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche contrasts the Dionysian will to power with the
influence of the sun god, Apollo.61 Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins describe the
Apollinian as “the principle of order, static beauty, and clear boundaries. The Dionysian
principle, in contrast, is the principle of frenzy, excess, and the collapse of boundaries.”62
These “art impulses of nature” are responsible for the greatness of Greek culture.63 The
relationship is best explained not as a tension, but as a harmony. Nietzsche writes:
“These two art drives must unfold their powers in a strict proportion, according to the law
of eternal justice. Where the Dionysian powers rise up as impetuously as we experience
them now, Apollo, too, must already have descended among us, wrapped in a cloud; and
the next generation will probably behold his most ample beautiful effects.”64 The result
is that “the Dionysian and the Apollinian, in new births ever following and mutually
augmenting one another, controlled the Hellenic genius.”65 Nietzsche argues that “naïve”
art, such as that of Homer, is the product of the Apollinian impulse; but of course “Apollo
could not live without Dionysus!”66 Nietzsche rejects such monotheism, or “Christian
monotono-theism,”67 in favor of the never-ending tension between his twin gods.68 At
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the end of Beyond Good and Evil, he alludes to Dionysus and his beloved Ariadne as the
gods of the religion of the future.69
The problem of modernity can be defined in terms of the victory of the
Apollinian, in the form of Platonic metaphysics, over the Dionysian. “This is the new
opposition,” Nietzsche writes: “the Dionysian and the Socratic—and the art of Greek
tragedy was wrecked on this.”70 Nietzsche places Socrates at odds with the spirit of the
Greek culture, represented, in his view, by the healthy struggle between Dionysus and
Apollo. “Consider the consequences of the Socratic maxims: ‘Virtue is knowledge; man
sins only from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy.’ In these three basic forms of
optimism lies the death of tragedy.”71 Socrates killed “the infinity of art” and with it the
infinity of Greek culture.72 If modernity is Apollinian, we cannot live without Dionysus,
the role Nietzsche seeks to play.
It must be noted that the tension between Dionysus and Apollo is less pronounced
in Nietzsche’s later writings. Some have noted that the later Dionysus possesses the
power for creation and destruction.73 This change, however, is easily accounted for
without altering the basic nature of the dyad. The victory of the Apollinian in Socrates
meant for Nietzsche that he had to supply the Dionysian countermeasure in the extreme.
In one of the most important parts of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche refers to
Dionysus as “that great ambiguous one and tempter god,” the god who was offered
Nietzsche’s first book as a sacrifice.74 Nietzsche remarks that he has learned much since
then, and refers to himself as “the last disciple and initiate of the god Dionysus,”
someone who “might begin at long last to offer you, my friends, a few tastes of this
philosophy, insofar as this is permitted to me.”75 This explains why Apollo becomes
secondary in his later writings: he came to understand more clearly that culture could
only be set right through a tragic philosophy and a Dionysian philosopher.76 Music in
in Nietzsche’s own metaphorical language, is thus not an alternative to the Christian God but only his final and
in a sense greatest modern mask.” Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995),
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general, and Wagner in particular, was no longer the answer. In Dionysian times, we
might find Nietzsche as the herald of the Apollinian. In his formulation, Nietzsche is not
so much a tempter-philosopher as he is our savior.77
In speaking of Dionysus as a philosopher, Nietzsche notes, “certainly the god in
question went further, very much further…and was always many steps ahead of me.”78
Dionysus understood, long before Nietzsche, that philosophy demands action. Dionysus
was more capable of destruction and thus more capable of creation. Hence The Birth of
Tragedy, a book calling others to action, was itself insufficient. His philosophy
eventually became more political as he sought out controversies of his age.79 Nietzsche
the author became Nietzsche the destroyer.
That Dionysus is related to destruction does not diminish his virtue. “The desire
for destruction, change, becoming, can be the expression of an overfull power pregnant
with the future…but it can also be the hatred of the ill-constituted, disinherited,
underprivileged, which destroys, has to destroy, because what exists, indeed existence
itself, all being itself, enrages and provokes it.”80 Just as creation is not always good,
destruction is not always bad. The difference lies in the goals. Destruction can be for the
sake of strength and becoming, an “expression of overflowing energy,” as much as it can
be the result of a hatred of life and growth. The Greek culture rested on a balance
between Dionysus and Apollo that resulted in creation and destruction of the right things
(truth) and for the right reason (life).
Nietzsche finds evidence to support his views elsewhere, most notably in Rome.
In many respects, Nietzsche argues, the Romans are better teachers in that they stand
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closer to us than do the Greeks.81 The Romans, for example, are a good example of a
culture that can thrive without philosophy, or at least without an extreme version of it.
“The Romans during their best period lived without philosophy”; conversely, the Greeks
were ruined by theirs.82 In pointing to the Romans as better teachers, Nietzsche suggests
that the thing most needed in modernity is an example of a strong culture where
philosophy in the platonic sense is not needed.
Nietzsche spent a lot of time looking to the past, but he does not mean to return
there. To conservatives, he writes: “one must go forward—step by step further into
decadence (that is my definition of modern ‘progress’). Once can check this development
and thus dam up degeneration, gather it and make it more vehement and sudden: one can
do no more.”83 On those who simply turn their backs on the whole of modernity, he
writes: “The main thing about them is not that they wish to go ‘back,’ but that they wish
to get—away. A little more strength, flight, courage, and artistic power, and they would
want to rise—not return!”84 It is not possible, nor is it desirable, to return to antiquity.
Nietzsche’s intent is not to resurrect the ancients, but to surpass all that has come
heretofore. If is not possible to return, then we must rise.
Modernity, then, is not so much a development of the Greek as a move away from
it. We are right in looking to the Greeks for guidance, but we looked to the wrong
Greeks, and now we pale in comparison. It is no wonder that the Greek influence is often
looked upon with such great disdain:
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everything one has achieved oneself, though apparently quite original and
sincerely admired, suddenly seemed to lose life and color and shriveled
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such a character.86
The first remedy for our shame is the acceptance of it.
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However much Nietzsche revered the Greeks, he too was overly modern in his
thinking at times. “I spoiled the grandiose Greek problem, as it had arisen before my
eyes, by introducing the most modern problems!” he writes. “I began to rave about ‘the
German spirit’ as if that were in the process even then of discovering and finding itself
again.”87 The Greek problem was the problem of nature, the problem of life, one that can
never, and indeed should never, be solved.
But that does not mean that Nietzsche spoiled the Greeks forever; they still exist
to be appreciated anew. As he cheers: “Greeks! Romans! The nobility of instinct, the
taste, the methodological research, the genius of organization and administration, the
faith in, the will to, man’s future, the great Yes to all things, become visible in the
imperium Romanum, visible for all the senses, the grand style no longer mere art but
become reality, truth, life.”88
At the end of Twilight of the Idols, one of his final works, Nietzsche answers the
question posed by the title “What I Owe to the Ancients.” The answer, he reveals, is
everything. The ancient culture is the only culture that does not possess the seeds of its
own overcoming; it is “still rich and even overflowing” enough to serve as the foundation
for a people.89 It can do so because it is based on a certain understanding of nature and
rank; it is based on a teaching of the will and a respect for life as the standard by which it
judges itself. In the Hellenic, Nietzsche finds not only a culture with a respect for will
and nature, but a model for philosophy and religion.90 He closes this work by going
further than he does in his other works: “Herewith I stand on the soil of which my
intention, my ability grows—I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus—I, the
teacher of the eternal recurrence.”91 With this statement he places himself on the same
level as his Zarathustra.92
IV. The Return To Nature
Perhaps the most important element that Nietzsche drew from Greek culture was
the notion of the eternal. He considered this essential in understanding the Greeks.
“What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries?”
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Nietzsche asks. “Eternal life, the eternal return of life; the future promised and hallowed
in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the overall continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.”93 The
Greeks loved life to its fullest, longing for the eternal, even if life remained the same.94
Of Dionysus and Apollo, it is Dionysus who more accurately represents the
eternal. “Dionysian art, too, wishes to convince us of the eternal joy of existence: only
we are to seek this joy not in phenomena, but behind them,” Nietzsche professes. “We
are to recognize that all that comes into being must be ready for a sorrowful end; we are
forced to look into the terrors of the individual existence—yet we are not to become rigid
with fear: a metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the bustle of the changing
features.”95 Dionysus is the god of becoming, and those who follow him are able to find
joy in the passing that accompanies it. Nietzschean art, of which Nietzsche’s philosophy
is a part, is Dionysian art. It celebrates eternal becoming.
The notion of the eternal has lost its place in modern philosophy, however, and
being has come to replace becoming. “You ask me which of the philosophers’ traits are
really idiosyncrasies?” Nietzsche asks.
For example, their lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very idea of
becoming….They think that they show their respect for a subject when
they de-historicize it….Death, change, old age, as well as procreation and
growth, are to their minds objections—even refutations. Whatever has
being does not become; whatever becomes does not have being. Now
they all believe, desperately even, in what has being. But since they never
grasp it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from them.96
Philosophy since Plato lacks this Dionysian element. Philosophers are concerned only
with questions of being, without examining life and truth in their strongest, most perfect
forms.
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While the turn from becoming to being was done for the sake of wisdom, the
result has been the opposite: nothing has been gained in terms of insight, yet much has
been lost in the process. In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche writes:
an essential disadvantage which the cessation of the metaphysical outlook
brings with it lies in the fact that the attention of the individual is too
firmly fixed on his own brief span of life and receives no stronger impulse
to work at the construction of enduring institutions intended to last for
centuries….For the metaphysical outlook bestows the belief that it offers
the last, ultimate foundation upon which the whole future of mankind is
then invited to establish and construct itself.97
Attending to matters of being, in practice, only concerns matters of our being, for
we can never know the whole of being. The better strategy involves turning our attention
to the eternal, for only there can we hope to glimpse being in its purest form. As
Nietzsche explains, “that everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of
becoming to a world of being.”98
Contemplating being has had dire consequences for man, not only in terms of
wisdom but also of perspective and will. Nietzsche writes: “as soon as we imagine
someone who is responsible for our being thus and thus, etc. (God, nature), and therefore
attribute to him the intention that we should exist and be happy or wretched, we corrupt
ourselves the innocence of becoming. We then have someone who wants to achieve
something through us and with us.”99 Concentrating on matters of being compromises
the will to power. If God, Nature, or the Forms are responsible for the order of the
universe and man is subservient to it, then nothing is left for the will. Being imprisons
the will; becoming frees it. The will to power itself is the doctrine of becoming. It is far
better that we should recognize that “all events, all motion, all becoming, as a
determination of degrees and relations of force, as a struggle,”100 for only then can we
realize the power and the primacy of the will and the true value of life.
This is not to say that the eternal can easily be endured. Consider what Nietzsche
says of the eternal return: “If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you
as you are or perhaps crush you.”101 That the eternal return requires great strength is
evident in its originator, Heraclitus. “The everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the
impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is,
as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought,” he writes.102 If modernity is the
story of man made weak, Nietzsche’s philosophy is a call to rank, for strength in all its
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guises. However much the eternal return is “the greatest weight,”103 Nietzsche agrees
with Heraclitus on the “innocence of becoming.” Heraclitus “discovered what wonderful
order, regularity and certainty manifested themselves in all coming-to-be; from this he
concluded that coming-to-be could not be anything evil or unjust.”104
The amount of strength required for the eternal return means that some
individuals, Nietzsche included, will view it as a release of the will; others, no doubt, will
be overwhelmed.105 The result is that time itself is experienced in different ways by
individuals according to their respective strength. “Some beings,” he writes, “might be
able to experience time backward, or alternately forward and backward (which would
involve another direction of life and another concept of cause and effect)….Rather the
world has become ‘infinite’ for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the
possibility that it may include infinite interpretations.”106 The notion of the eternal, and
with it the doctrine of the eternal return, is the logical consequence of the will to power,
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and the order of rank. It is the height of his teaching, and the
principle to which the others point.
It is only through the eternal that the will can reach its peak. No longer is it
subject to ressentiment for the past, a bad conscience in the present, or an impotence for
the future: “‘The world is perfect’—thus says the instinct of the most spiritual, the Yessaying instinct.”107 Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes, “The highest state a philosopher can
attain [is to] to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for that is
amor fati.”108 His new philosophy loves life; it is full of gratitude and joy. Releasing the
will through a love of the eternal means more than a supreme affirmation of the self; it is
an affirmation of human nature in its imperfect splendor.
Although Nietzsche castigates Christianity and other moralities, in the end, his
eternal return is a morality of sorts, one not inconsistent with what he says of
moralities.109 He is not amoral or immoral; it is a certain type of morality that he rejects.
He writes:
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at bottom I abhor all those moralities which say: ‘Do not do this!
Renounce! Overcome yourself!’ But I am well disposed toward those
moralities which goad me to do something and do it again, from morning
till evening, and then to dream of it at night, and to think of nothing except
doing this well, as well as I alone can do it. When one lives like that, one
thing after another that simply does not belong to such a life drops
off….But I do not like negative virtues—virtues whose very essence it is
to negate and deny oneself something.110
As a morality, the eternal return includes an order of rank; it is anything but
egalitarian in nature. Not only does it not negate, but also it is a profound affirmation of
the self and of life. It is a religion without a church, without an afterlife (indeed, with no
other life), and without a need for the divine.111 Nietzsche’s is a religion that loves gods
for man’s sake.112
V. Conclusion
Absent from the discussion thus far has been the extent to which it is possible to
combine philosophy, politics, and religion in the manner Nietzsche describes. How
likely is it that philosophers of the future will fashion new gods and become legislators
and creators of values? Nietzsche himself is ambivalent on the issue. Although he
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Nietzsche, Gay Science, §304. This is what Nietzsche means when he writes, “the law of the conservation of
energy demands eternal recurrence.” Will to Power, §1063.
On this point, White writes: “The doctrine of eternal return is neither bad physics nor bad metaphysics, but
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sincerely hopes it will come to pass, he is fully aware that his teaching might bear no
fruit. That is why he writes with such urgency and why his later philosophy is more
radical.
More thoughtful observers will question whether the combination is even
desirable. Tocqueville, we should recall, warned that religion is too important—and
politics too easily corrupted—to warrant the dependence of one on the other. That
Nietzsche does not (or cannot) describe the particulars of a religion of the future is
anything but reassuring, and can only fan the flames of those who draw lines from him to
fascism and the Nazis.
In any event, Nietzsche wants us to follow him in thinking that his program is
possible and necessary and the only means to redirect the course of an increasingly
decadent West.
Nietzsche has much to add to the discussion of religion and politics, if only
because he challenges our liberal sensibilities on the need to separate church and state.
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